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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Due Process - State
Procedures for Granting Discretionary Parole Held
to Comport with Requirements of Procedural Due
Process. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal
and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). In Green-
holtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional
Complex,1 the United States Supreme Court reviewed Ne-
braska's criminal parole procedures. The Court determined
that there is no inherent or constitutional right to parole.
While the Court found that the wording of the Nebraska pa-
role statute did create an expectation of parole that was sub-
ject to due process protection, it also found that the proce-
dures followed under the Nebraska statute were sufficient to
satisfy due process.
It is submitted that the Court improperly applied the two-
part analysis that had been developed for procedural due pro-
cess questions in administrative law. In so doing, the Court
inappropriately focused upon the difficulties in administration
of hearings rather than the nature of convicted persons' rights
and interests. Although the Court recognized a protected in-
terest under the wording of the Nebraska statute, the hearing
procedures approved under the statute are not adequate to
guard against the risk of error or to protect against arbitrary
action.
I. THE DECISION
Greenholtz was a class action suit brought by inmates of
the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex against the in-
dividual members of the Board of Parole. The inmates
claimed that the procedures adopted by the Board in deter-
mining eligibility for discretionary parole2 denied them proce-
dural due process.3
Nebraska statutes provide for discretionary parole when
1. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
2. Mandatory parole under NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1, 107 (1)(b) (1976), whereby an
inmate is automatically paroled when he has served his maximum term less good-
time credits, was not part of the case. 442 U.S. at 4.
3. 442 U.S. at 4.
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an inmate has served his minimum term, less credits for good
behavior.4 Each year, initial review hearings must be held for
every inmate. At this initial review, the Board decides
whether to grant an informal hearing based on an examina-
tion of the inmate's records. This second hearing consists of
an interview of the inmate and a consideration of any state-
ments or letters that he provides. If parole is denied, the
Board informs the inmate of the reason and makes recom-
mendations for the future.5 The factors considered by the
Board in determining whether parole should be granted are
prescribed by statute.'
The district court found that the inmates had a "condi-
tional liberty interest" protected by the Constitution and that
the guidelines followed by the Board did not meet the re-
quirements of due process.7 This decision was upheld by the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. However, the court
made an additional finding that the statute created a pro-
tected interest. The circuit court modified the procedures re-
quired by the district court and ordered the following:
1) A full, formal hearing for each eligible inmate;
2) Advance written notice of the precise time of the
hearing;
3) A statement of the factors to be relied upon by the
Board in making its determination;
4) The right to appear in person and present evidence;
5) The maintenance of a record of the proceedings;
4. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1, 110(1) (1976).
5. 442 U.S. at 4.
6. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1, 114(1) (1976) provides as follows:
Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed of-
fender who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release un-
less it is of the opinion that his release should be deferred because:
(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the
conditions of parole;
(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or
promote disrespect for the law;
(c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on in-
stitutional discipline; or
(d) His continued correctional treatment, medical care, or voca-
tional or other training in the facility will substantially en-
hance his capacity to lead a law-abiding life when released at
a later date.




6) A written statement of the reasons and the evidence re-
lied upon by the Board for denial.8
Certiorari was granted in order to resolve a conflict among the
circuit courts regarding the applicability of due process re-
quirements to parole proceedings.9
The Supreme Court held that there is no constitutional or
inherent right of a convicted person to parole,10 noting that a
state had no duty to establish a parole system.11 Further, it
held that no right to parole is created when a state merely
provides for the possibility of parole by the creation of a pa-
role system. 12 The Court did find, however, that a right to pa-
role was created in this case by the unique language of the
Nebraska statute which used the word "shall. ' 13 By the terms
of the statute, parole was mandated upon the fulfillment of
stated conditions. Accordingly, the Court analyzed the statu-
tory procedures to determine whether they provided sufficient
constitutional protection. " These procedures were found to be
adequate. In so finding, the Court specifically rejected the re-
quirements of the court of appeals for a formal hearing and a
statement of evidence relied upon by the Board in an adverse
parole determination. 5
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In Greenholtz, the Court was faced with a conflict between
8. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex v. Greenholtz, 576 F.2d 1274,
1285 (8th Cir. 1978).
9. The following circuits have held that due process is not applicable to parole
determination: the Fifth Circuit: Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 917 (1976); the Sixth Circuit: Scott v. Kentucky Parole Board, No.
74 - 1899 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1975), remanded to consider mootness, 429 U.S. 60 (1976).
On the other hand, the following circuits have held that due process does apply: The
Fourth Circuit: Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1977); the Third Circuit:
Hill v. Attorney General of the United States, 550 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977); the Sev-
enth Circuit: United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975);
the District of Columbia Circuit: Childs v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); the Second Circuit: United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y.
State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974).
10. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7
(1979).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 11.
13. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
14. 442 U.S. at 12.
15. Id. at 14-15.
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two divergent trends in the case law regarding procedural due
process protection for convicted persons. On the one hand,
there was a trend toward recognizing constitutionally pro-
tected procedures related to parole. On the other hand, the
Court, in recent years, had restricted procedural protection in
the area of prison administration.
The Court's major parole decision was Morrissey v.
Brewer16 where the Court held that minimum due process was
required for parole revocation. Such constitutional protection
was accorded parolees because they were found to have an in-
terest within the "liberty or property" protection of the four-
teenth amendment. 17 This interest was found to be one of
"conditional liberty,"18 where a parolee is granted the right to
live and work in the community. In short, the Court described
this as the parolee's right to do many of the same things
which those who have never been convicted of a crime can
do.19
The Court pointed out that revocation of parole consti-
tutes a "grievous loss" in the light of the kind of freedom
which the parolee enjoys. 20 In addition, the Court noted that
although discretion is involved in the revocation procedure, a
"simply factual hearing will not interfere with the exercise of
discretion. '21
Due process protection regarding parole was extended in
Wolff v. McDonnell.22 In that case the Court held that due
process safeguards were required to revoke those credits that
an inmate would accumulate towards parole by his good be-
havior, his so-called "good-time credits."2 3 The Court noted
16. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
17. Id. at 481.




22. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
23. Id. at 555. NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1, 1070 (Supp. 1972), which provides for the
allowance and reduction of good-time states:
(1) The chief executive officer of a facility shall reduce, for parole purposes, for
good behavior and faithful performance of duties while confined in a facility
the term of a committed offender as follows: Two months on the first year, two
months on the second year, three months on the third year, four months for
each succeeding year of his term and pro rata for any part therof which is less
than a year. In addition, for especially meritorious behavior or exceptional per-
[Vol. 63:665
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that inmates have liberty rights despite their criminal convic-
tion, and the Court listed the constitutional protections al-
lowed convicted persons as follows:
[T]hough his rights may be diminished by the needs and ex-
igencies of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not
wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is im-
prisoned for a crime. There is no iron curtain drawn be-
tween the Constitution and the prisons of this country. Pris-
oners have been held to enjoy substantial religious freedom
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.... They re-
tain rights of access to the courts. . . . Prisoners are pro-
tected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from invidious discrimination based on
race. . . . Prisoners may also claim the protection of the
Due Process Clause. They may not be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property without due process of law.24
In contrast to these parole decisions are the cases which
deal with procedural due process questions in prison adminis-
tration. In Meachum v. Fano2" and in Montanye v. Haymes,2"
prison inmates claimed rights to a hearing before being trans-
ferred to less desirable state prisons. The Supreme Court
heard both cases on the same day, and in both decisions the
Court denied due process protection. According to the test es-
tablished in Board of Regents v. Roth,27 the nature of the in-
formance of his duties, an offender may receive a further reduction, for parole
purposes, not to exceed five days, for any month of imprisonment. The total of
all such reductions shall be deducted:
(a) From his minimum term, to determine the date of his eligibility for
release on parole; and
(b) From his maximum term, to determine the date when his release
on parole becomes mandatory under the provisions of section 83-1, 111.
(2) Reductions of such terms may be forfeited, withheld and restored by the
chief executive officer of the facility after the offender has been consulted re-
garding the charges of misconduct. No reduction of an offender's term for es-
pecially meritorious behavior or exceptional performance of his duties shall be
forfeited or withheld after an offender is released on parole.
(3) Good-time or other reductions of sentence granted under the provisions of
any law prior to July 6, 1972 may be forfeited, withheld, or restored in accor-
dance with the terms of this act.
24. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) (citations omitted).
25. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
26. 427 U.S. 236 (1976).
27. 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
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terest involved was first examined. 28 No liberty interest was
found to be implicated in the transfer of inmates.29 The Court
denied a liberty interest because "given a valid conviction, the
criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his
liberty to the extent that the State may confine him and sub-
ject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the condi-
tions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitu-
tion."30 In addition, the Court in Meachum v. Fano discussed
the nature of the decision involved as being a discretionary
one: "Transfers between institutions . . are made for a vari-
ety of reasons and often involve no more than informed pre-
dictions as, to what would best serve institutional security or
the safety and welfare of the inmate."31
These cases represented two lines of thinking that con-
fronted the Court in Greenholtz. The protection allowed in
the area of parole stood in contrast to the discretion granted
to administrators in the prison transfer cases. The question
addressed on both sides was one of deciding what constitu-
tional rights remained for persons after criminal conviction.
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In Greenholtz, the Court first reviewed the nature of the
interest involved according to the two-part test established in
Board of Regents v. Roth: 2 (1) does the nature of the interest
fall within the "liberty or property" language of the four-
teenth amendment; and if so, (2) what procedural measures
are necessary to protect that interest. The test emerged from
the statement in Roth that "to determine whether due process
requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the
'weight,' but to the nature of the interest at stake." 3 The
Court in Roth specifically restricted the approach of weighing
and balancing the parties' interest to the second step, that of
determining the form of hearing required. 4
The central issue in determining the "nature" of the inter-
28. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976).
29. Id. at 223-24.
30. Id. at 224.
31. Id. at 225.
32. 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 570.
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est at stake in Greenholtz was whether the "conditional lib-
erty" interest found in Morrissey v. Brewer applied to in-
mates prior to parole. The Court held that it did not stating
that "[t]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a con-
victed person to be conditionally released before the expira-
tion of a valid sentence. The natural desire of an individual to
be released is indistinguishable from the initial resistance to
being confined. '35 That desire for liberty is not a liberty inter-
est protected under the fourteenth amendment because the
inmate has been convicted. The Court cited the language of
Meachum v. Fano for that proposition: "[G]iven a valid con-
viction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally de-
prived of his liberty."3 "
In addition, the Greenholtz Court reasoned, the "condi-
tional liberty" interest of Morrissey v. Brewer did not apply
in this case because the parole determination is a predictive
decision, unlike the factual decision made in the parole revo-
cation of Morrissey. While "[t]he first step in a revocation de-
cision . . . [involved] a wholly retrospective factual ques-
tion, '37 the parole release decision was found to be "more
subtle and [to depend] on an amalgam of elements, some of
which are factual but many of which are purely subjective ap-
praisals." 8 The Court directly compared the parole release
decision to the prison transfer decision in Meachum v. Fano.
"[T]he general interest asserted here is no more substantial
than the inmate's hope that he will not be transferred to an-
other prison. . .."31
The inmates next argued that the language of the Ne-
braska statute created an expectation of release, which was an
interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. The statute
stated:
Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a
committed offender who is eligible for release on parole, it
shall order his release unless it is of the opinion that his re-
lease should be deferred because:
35. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7
(1979).
36. Id. (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976)).
37. 442 U.S. at 9 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972)).
38. 442 U.S. at 9-10.
39. Id. at 10.
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(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not-conform
to the conditions of parole;
(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his
crime or promote disrespect for law;
(c) His release would have a substantially adverse ef-
fect on institutional discipline; or
(d) His continued correctional treatment, medical care,
or vocational or other training in the facility will sub-
stantially enhance his capacity to lead a law-abiding
life when released at a later date.40
The Court accepted the inmates' view that the structure of
the statute provided a protected interest through the use of
the word "shall" in conjunction with four stated exceptions.
By citing prior case law, the majority reaffirmed the rule that
''a person's interest in a benefit is a 'property' interest for due
process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit
understandings that support his claims of entitlement to the
benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing."'41
Having found a constitutionally protected interest by the
terms of the statute, the Court then turned to an examination
of the statutory procedures in order to decide if they provided
sufficient due process protection.42 The Court found that re-
peated adversary hearings were not required and that the Ne-
braska practice of making an initial determination each year
for each inmate was sufficient.4 The purpose of the notice
procedure for hearings on those inmates who passed the ini-
tial determination was to inform the inmate in advance of the
month during which the hearing would be held. It also posted
notice of the exact time on the day of the hearing itself.44 This
was held to be constitutionally adequate notice.45 The Court
found that the hearing need not be full or formal in order to
satisfy due process.4 The due process requirement would be
satisfied if an inmate were allowed to appear on his own be-
half and to present supporting letters and documents. Finally,
40. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1, 114(1) (1976).
41. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 n.6 (1976), (quoting Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972)).
42. 442 U.S. at 12.
43. Id. at 15-16.
44. Id. at 14 n.6.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 15.
[Vol. 63:665
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
the Parole Board's practice of communicating the reason for
its denial was held to be adequate without the further require-
ment that the Board give a summary of the evidence relied
upon.47
IV. CRITIQUE
In finding no protected interest except that created by
statute, the Court focused primarily on the type of the deter-
mination that must be made at a parole release hearing. The
nature of the determination is not a factor in deciding the na-
ture of the interest as Board of Regents v. Roth and its prog-
eny have made clear. Rather, the type of the determination to
be made dictates what evidence the Board must consider and
what other procedural safeguards are required once a pro-
tected interest has been found. In Greenholtz, the Court's
consideration of the nature of the hearing, while considering
the interest at stake, unnecessarily blurs the two-step analysis
established for questions of procedural due process.48
The nature of the decision to grant parole release in
Greenholtz was found to be similar to that made by prison
officials in transferring inmates.4 9 By making that comparison,
the Court sought to show that parole release was different
from parole revocation" discussed in Morrissey v. Brewer.
Having distinguished Morrissey v. Brewer on the basis of the
decision to be made, the Court in Greenholtz then stated that
the nature of the interest was not a "conditional liberty" in-
terest to be governed under Morrissey.5 1 Therefore, the Court
reasoned, there was no interest protected by due process in
the inmates' expectation of parole.2
The Court set up a contrast between decisions that are
factual and those that are predictive. Factual decisions are
retrospective, examining whether an inmate has satisfied cer-
tain conditions,'5 such as good behavior. Predictive determi-
nations, on the other hand, entail a "discretionary assessment
47. Id. at 16.
48. See text accompanying notes 16-19, supra.
49. See text accompanying note 39, supra.
50. Id.





of a multiplicity of imponderables, entailing primarily what a
man is and what he may become rather than simply what he
has done."' "5 Not only does that reasoning serve to confuse the
two-step analysis required for procedural due process ques-
tions, as discussed above, but it also distorts the clear lan-
guage of Morrissey v. Brewer.
In Morrissey, the Court recognized that the parole revoca-
tion determination was predictive. The Court noted that two
steps were involved in a parole revocation decision: (1) did the
parolee violate the conditions of his parole, and (2) should the
parolee be recommitted to prison or should other steps be
taken to protect society and improve the chances of rehabili-
tation?5 5 The Court emphasized that, while the first step is
relatively simple, "[t]he second question involves the applica-
tion of expertise by the parole authority in making a predic-
tion as to the ability of the individual to live in society with-
out committing antisocial acts. '56 Accordingly, the second
question was described as "not purely factual, but also predic-
tive and discretionary."5 In addition, the Court in Morrissey
v. Brewer had noted that although discretion is involved in a
parole revocation determination, a "simple factual hearing
will not interfere with the exercise of discretion. ' 58 Therefore,
while the Court was correct in terming parole release determi-
nations "predictive," it did not successfully distinguish Mor-
rissey v. Brewer by looking to the nature of the determina-
tions involved.
In essence, the decision in Greenholtz represents an at-
tempt to limit some of the consitutional rights remaining after
conviction, rights that were protected in Morrissey and Wolff
v. McDonnell. The Court makes this limitation on the basis of
protecting the discretion of prison administrators in the man-
ner recognized by the Court in Meachum v. Fano and
Montanye v. Haymes. However, the two lines of cases come
down on different sides of the question on whether liberty in-
terests remain for an individual after criminal conviction.
The regrettable result of the Greenholtz opinion is that it
54. Id.
55. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1972).
56. Id. at 480.
57. Id. at 471.
58. Id. at 483.
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creates further ambiguity in the status of convicted persons
under the Constitution. Under Greenholtz, the state may con-
fine individuals and subject them to prison rules with the sole
limitation that the prison conditions "do not otherwise violate
the Constitution. ' 59 It is not clear what conditions would be
otherwise violative, so long as those conditions are protected
under the discretionary judgment of the prison officials after
Greenholtz. Unfortunately, it is possible that this case will
now be cited in order to justify greater restrictions, punish-
ments and deprivations of benefits under the guise of "admin-
istrative discretion."
Ambiguity also arises in the case law on parole itself in the
wake of Greenholtz. Before this decision, convicted persons
had due process protection for their "good-time" credits prior
to any parole decision, 0 and they had that protection in the
attempt to revoke parole once it has been granted. They do
not, after Greenholtz however, have that protection in the pa-
role decision itself. It is possible that, in line with this deci-
sion, the protection of "good-time" credits in Wolff v. McDon-
nell will be limited to the statutory language on that case
itself.6 1 Thus, the only procedural protection remaining in pa-
role decisions would be that afforded parolees after they have
been released from prison.
Through this decision, the majority equated an inmate's
interest in parole with an inmate's hope that he will not be
transferred to another prison. 2 However, there seems to be a
vast qualitative difference between these two interests. Parole
carries significant weight for the public interests. As Justice
Burger stated in Morrissey v. Brewer, "[s]ociety has a stake in
whatever may be the chance of restoring [the individual] to
59. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976); accord, Montanye v. Haymes, 427
U.S. 236, 242 (1975). In Montanye the Court stated: "As long as the conditions or
degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence im-
posed on him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process
Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judi-
cial oversight."
60. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
61. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225-27 (1976), where the Court sought to
limit the holding in Wolff v. McDonnell to the statutory creation of a protected
interest.
62. 442 U.S. 1, 10 (1979).
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normal and useful life within the law.""3 Prison transfers, on
the other hand, are often made for purposes of institutional
security or for the safety and welfare of a particular inmate. 4
In comparison with society's interest in parole, the interest in
prison tranfers would seem to be minimal.
Even where the Greenholtz Court did recognize a pro-
tected interest in parole, its approval of the procedures em-
ployed by the Nebraska Parole Board showed insufficient at-
tention to the risks of error attendant in the parole release
decision. 5 In Greenholtz, the following measures were held to
be satisfactory for Nebraska parole determinations:
a) notice in advance of the month in which the hearing is to
be held, with the exact time being posted on the day of the
hearing;
b) the right of the inmate to appear in person and to present
evidence on his behalf;
c) information and documents used by the Board in its deci-
sion being made available to the inmate within the Board's
discretion;
d) a communication of the reason(s) for denial, but not a
statement of the evidence relied upon.6
Expressly included was the requirement of a formal hear-
ing for each inmate.6 7 This was justified on the grounds that
the requirement of a hearing "would provide at best a negligi-
ble decrease in the risk of error."6 8 As Justice Marshall
pointed out in his dissenting opinion, however, the risk of er-
ror in a parole determination is substantial.6 9 Indeed, in the
63. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972) (citations omitted).
64. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976).
65. See, e.g., 442 U.S. at 32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. 442 U.S. at 14-16.
67. See text accompanying note 15, supra.
68. 442 U.S. at 14.
69. See, e.g., 442 U.S. at 33 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Kohiman v. Norton, 380 F.
Supp. 1073 (D. Conn. 1974) (parole denied because file erroneously indicated that
applicant had used gun in committing robbery); Leonard v. Mississippi State Proba-
tion and Parole Board, 373 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Miss. 1974), reversed 509 F.2d 820
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 998 (1975) (prisoner denied parole on basis of
illegal disciplinary action); In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 537 P.2d 384, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 552 (1975) (factually incorrect material in file led parole officers to believe that
prisoner had violent tendencies and that his "family reject[ed] him"); State v.
Phlabel, 61 N.J. Super. 242, 160 A.2d 647 (1960) (files erroneously showed that pris-
oner was under a life sentence in another jurisdiction).
[Vol. 63:665
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Greenholtz case itself, an inmate was notified that he was de-
nied parole and that the Board thought he should enlist in
self-improvement programs even though he was already en-
rolled in all such programs available. 70
A reduction in the risk of error could have been accom-
plished in Greenholtz by requiring a written statement by the
Board of the evidence relied upon. Such a requirement would
place on the Board no greater procedural burden than that
required in Morrissey v. Brewer and in Wolff v. McDonnell,71
and more significantly, such a statement would result in a
more careful consideration of the evidence. 2
Similarly, a more specific advance notice requirement,
stating at least the date of the hearing, would afford greater
procedural protection with minimal administrative burden. In
upholding the Board's practice of giving advance notice only
of the month of the hearing with the time posted only on the
day of the hearing itself, the Court stated that no claim ex-
isted before it of serious prejudice. 3 The respondents' brief
shows, however, that the inmates had argued the need for
more specific notice so that inmates could prepare their
cases 7 4 for the parole hearings. By adopting the additional
procedural requirements of more specific notice and a written
statement of evidence relied upon, the Court could have pro-
vided a substantially greater procedural protection. Such mea-
sures would not sacrifice efficiency to a prohibitive degree be-
70. 442 U.S. at 33 n.15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972), the Court adopted the fol-
lowing procedural requirements for parole revocation:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the pa-
rolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to
present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds
good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral and detached" hear-
ing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be
judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to
the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
The Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), adopted these procedures in
part, specifically rejecting the right to cross-examination, 418 U.S. at 567, and the
right to legal counsel, 418 U.S. at 570.
72. See 442 U.S. 1, 33 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73. 442 U.S. 1, 14 n.6 (1979).
74. Brief for Respondents, 65-66.
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cause the information of hearing dates and evidence relied
upon would be within the knowledge of the Board. The only
additional administrative burden would consist of making the
information available to the inmate.
V. CONCLUSION
In assessing the nature of an inmate's interest in being re-
leased on discretionary parole when eligible, the Court in
Greenholtz blurred its traditional two-step procedural due
process analysis by examining the nature of the state's deter-
mination procedures affecting that interest. This approach not
only leaves unclear what analysis courts are to apply in future
procedural due process determinations but, as applied in
Greenholtz, also reveals an improper interpretation of the
proceeding employed in recent procedural due process cases.
In finding that there was no protected interest in parole
releases, the Court ignored the importance of parole to society
in many respects, including sentencing and rehabilitation. It
similarly treated lightly the practical effects of the right to pa-
role created by the mere existence of a state parole system.
This was emphasized by the Court's analysis of the interest
created by statutory language, which interest was not satisfac-
torily distinguished from that created under the existence of a
parole system itself. Finally, even where the Court found an
interest entitled to some measure of constitutional protection,
the minimum requirements approved are insufficient to over-
come the risk of error and prejudice to the inmates.
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TORTS - Products Liability - Strict Liability and
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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Wisconsin Supreme Court first adopted a strict
tort liability theory in products liability cases,1 it was pre-
1. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967) (holding that fulfilling
the elements of RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) constituted "negli-
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